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1 Introduction.
Any economic analyses of climate change policy must include a model of damages, i.e., a
relationship that translates changes in temperature (and possibly changes in precipitation
and other climate-related variables) to economic losses. Economic losses will of course include
losses of GDP and consumption that might result from reduced agricultural productivity or
from dislocations resulting from higher sea levels, but also the dollar-equivalent costs of
possible climate-related increases in morbidity, mortality, and social disruption. Because of
the lack of data and the considerable uncertainties involved, modeling damages is probably
the most difficult aspect of analyzing climate change policy. There are uncertainties in other
aspects of climate change policy — for example, how rapidly greenhouse gases (GHGs) will
accumulate in the atmosphere absent an abatement policy, to what extent and how rapidly
temperature will increase, and the current and future costs of abatement — but damages
from climate change is the area we understand the least. It must be modeled, but it is
important to understand the uncertainties involved and their policy implications.
Most quantitative economic studies of climate change policy utilize a “damage function”
that relates temperature change directly to the levels of real GDP and consumption. Fu-
ture consumption, for example, is taken to be the product of a loss function and “but-for
consumption,” i.e., consumption in the absence of any warming. With no warming, the loss
function is equal to 1, but as the temperature increases the value of the loss function de-
creases. This approach is reasonably simple in that any projected path for temperature can
be directly translated into an equivalent path for consumption. In other words, consumption
at time t depends on temperature at time t. Given a social utility function that “values”
consumption, one can then evaluate a particular policy (assuming we know its costs and can
project its effects on GHG concentrations and temperature).
In a recent paper (Pindyck (2009)), I have argued that on both theoretical and empirical
grounds, the economic impact of warming should be modeled as a relationship between
temperature change and the growth rate of GDP as opposed to the level of GDP. This means
that warming can have a permanent impact on future GDP and consumption. It makes
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the analysis somewhat more complicated, however, because consumption at some future
date depends not simply on the temperature at that date, but instead on the entire path of
temperature, and thus the path of the growth rate of consumption, up to that date. The issue
I address in this paper is the extent to which these two different approaches to modeling
damages — temperature affecting consumption directly versus temperature affecting the
growth rate of consumption — differ in terms of their policy implications.
This issue must be addressed in the context of uncertainty, which is at the heart of climate
change policy. It is difficult to justify the immediate adoption of a stringent abatement
policy based on an economic analysis that focuses on “most likely” scenarios for increases in
temperature and economic impacts and uses consensus estimates of discount rates and other
relevant parameters.1 But one could ask whether a stringent policy might be justified by a
cost-benefit analysis that accounts for a full distribution of possible outcomes.
In Pindyck (2009), I showed how probability distributions for temperature change and
economic impact could be inferred from climate science and economic impact studies, and
incorporated in the analysis of climate change policy. The framework I used, which I use
again here, is based on a simple measure of “willingness to pay” (WTP): the fraction of
consumption w∗(τ ) that society would be willing to sacrifice, now and throughout the future,
to ensure that any increase in temperature at a specific horizon H, ∆TH, is limited to τ .
Whether the reduction in consumption corresponding to some w∗(τ ) is sufficient to limit
warming to τ is a separate question that is not addressed; in effect WTP applies to the
“demand” side of policy analysis. The advantage of this approach, however, is that there is
no need to project GHG emissions and atmospheric concentrations, or estimate abatement
costs. Instead the focus is on uncertainties over temperature change and its economic impact.
My earlier paper was based on what I called the current “state of knowledge” regarding
global warming and its impact. I used information on the distributions for temperature
change from scientific studies assembled by the IPCC (2007) and information about eco-
1The Stern Review (2007) argues for a stringent abatement policy, but as Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman
(2007), Mendelsohn (2008) and others point out, it makes assumptions about temperature change, economic
impact, abatement costs, and discount rates that are outside the consensus range.
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nomic impacts from recent “integrated assessment models” (IAMs) to fit displaced gamma
distributions for these variables. But unlike existing IAMs, I modeled economic impact as a
relationship between temperature change and the growth rate of consumption as opposed its
level. I examined whether “reasonable” values for the remaining parameters (e.g., the start-
ing growth rate and the index of risk aversion) can yield values of w∗(τ ) well above 3% for
small values of τ , which might support stringent abatement. I also used a counterfactual —
and pessimistic — scenario for temperature change: Under “business as usual” (BAU), the
atmospheric GHG concentration immediately increases to twice its pre-industrial level, which
leads to an (uncertain) increase in temperature at the horizon H, and then (from feedback
effects or further emissions) a gradual further doubling of that temperature increase.
In this paper, I use the same displaced gamma distributions for temperature change
and economic impact, but I compare two alternative damage models — a direct impact of
temperature change on consumption versus a growth rate impact. I calibrate and “match”
the two models by matching estimates of GDP/temperature change pairs from the group of
IAMs at a specific horizon. I then calculate and compare WTPs for both models based on
expected discounted utility, using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function.
I find that for either damage model, the resulting estimates of w∗(τ ) are generally below
2% or 3%, even for τ around 2 or 3◦C. This is because there is limited weight in the tails
of the calibrated distributions for ∆T and its impact. Larger estimates of WTP result
for particular combinations of parameter values (e.g., an index of risk aversion close to 1
and a low initial GDP growth rate), but overall, the results are consistent with moderate
abatement. A direct impact generally yields a larger WTP than a growth rate impact, and
the sign and extent of the difference varies with changes in parameter values. Overall, there
are no substantial differences between the two models in terms of policy implications.2
The next section discusses the probability distribution and dynamic trajectory for tem-
2As with my earlier study, I ignore the implications of the opposing irreversibilities inherent in climate
change policy and the value of waiting for more information. Immediate action reduces the largely irreversible
build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere, but waiting avoids an irreversible investment in abatement capital that
might turn out to be at least partly unnecessary, and the net effect of these irreversibilities is unclear. For
a discussion of the interaction of uncertainty and irreversibility, see Pindyck (2007).
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perature change. Section 3 discusses the two alternative ways of modeling economic impact,
and the corresponding probability distributions that capture uncertainty over that impact.
Section 4 explains the calculation of willingness to pay. Numerical results are presented and
discussed in Sections 5 and 6, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Temperature.
According to the IPCC (2007), under “business as usual” (BAU), i.e., no abatement policy,
growing GHG emissions would likely lead to a doubling of the atmospheric CO2e concen-
tration relative to the pre-industrial level by the end of this century. That, in turn, would
cause an increase in global mean temperature that would “most likely” range between 1.0◦C
to 4.5◦C, with an expected value of 2.5◦C to 3.0◦C. The IPCC report indicates that this
range, derived from a “summary” of the results of 22 scientific studies the IPCC surveyed,
represents a roughly 66- to 90-percent confidence interval, i.e., there is a 5 to 17-percent
probability of a temperature increase above 4.5◦C.
The 22 studies also provide rough estimates of increases in temperature at the outer
tail of the distribution. In summarizing them, the IPCC translated the implied outcome
distributions into a standardized form that makes the studies comparable, and created graphs
showing multiple outcome distributions implied by groups of studies. Those distributions
suggest that there is a 5% probability that a doubling of the CO2e concentration relative to
the pre-industrial level would lead to a global mean temperature increase of 7◦C or more,
and a 1% probability that it would lead to a temperature increase of 10◦C or more. I fit
a three-parameter displaced gamma distribution for ∆T to these 5% and 1% points and
to a mean temperature change of 3.0◦C. This distribution conforms with the distributions
summarized by the IPCC. Finally, I assume (consistent with the IPCC’s focus on the end of
this century) that the fitted distribution for ∆T applies to a 100-year horizon H.
4
2.1 Displaced Gamma Distribution.
The displaced gamma distribution is given by:
f(x; r, λ, θ) =
λr
Γ(r)
(x− θ)r−1e−λ(x−θ) , x ≥ θ , (1)
where Γ(r) =
∫
∞
0 s
r−1e−sds is the Gamma function. The moment generating function for (1)
is
Mx(t) = E(e
tx) =
(
λ
λ− t
)r
etθ .
Thus the mean, variance and skewness (around the mean) are E(x) = r/λ+ θ, V(x) = r/λ2,
and S(x) = 2r/λ3 respectively.
Fitting f(x; r, λ, θ) to a mean of 3◦C, and the 5% and 1% points at 7◦C and 10◦C re-
spectively yields r = 3.8, λ = 0.92, and θ = −1.13. The distribution is shown in Figure 1.
It has a variance and skewness around the mean of 4.49 and 9.76 respectively. Note that
this distribution implies that there is a small (2.9 percent) probability that a doubling of the
CO2e concentration will lead to a reduction in mean temperature, consistent with several
of the scientific studies. The distribution also implies that the probability of a temperature
increase of 4.5◦C or greater is 21%.
2.2 Trajectory for ∆Tt.
Recall that this fitted distribution for ∆T pertains to the 100-year horizon H. To allow for
possible feedback effects and/or further emissions, I assume that ∆Tt → 2∆TH as t gets
large. As summarized in Weitzman (2009), the simplest dynamic model relating ∆Tt to the
GHG concentration Gt is the differential equation
d∆T/dt = m1[ln(Gt/G0)/ ln 2 − m2∆Tt] . (2)
Assuming Gt initially doubles to 2G0, ∆Tt = ∆TH at t = H, and ∆Tt → 2∆TH as t → ∞,
implies that ∆Tt follows the trajectory:
∆Tt = 2∆TH[1− (1/2)
t/H ] , (3)
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Thus if ∆TH = 5
◦C, ∆Tt reaches 2.93
◦C after 50 years, 5◦C after 100 years, 7.5◦C after 200
years, and then gradually approaches 10◦C.
This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a trajectory for ∆T when it is unconstrained
(and ∆TH happens to equal 5
◦C), and when it is constrained so that ∆TH ≤ τ = 3
◦C. Note
that even when constrained, ∆TH is a random variable and (unless τ = 0) will be less than
τ with probability 1; in Figure 2 it happens to be 2.5◦C. If τ = 0, then ∆T = 0 for all t.
3 Impact of Warming.
Most economic studies of climate change assume that ∆T has a direct impact on GDP
(and/or consumption), modeled via a “loss function” L(∆T ), with L(0) = 1 and L′ < 0.
Thus GDP at some horizon H is L(∆TH)GDPH , where GDPH is but-for GDP in the absence
of warming. This “direct impact” approach has been used in all of the integrated assessment
models that I am aware of. However, there are reasons to expect warming to affect the growth
rate of GDP as opposed to the level. At issue is how these two alternative approaches to
modeling the impact of warming — direct versus growth rate — differ in their implications
for estimates of willingness to pay to limit warming.
3.1 Direct Impact.
The most widely used loss function has been the inverse-quadratic. For example, the recent
version of the Nordhaus (2008) DICE model uses the following loss function:
L = 1/[1 + pi1∆T + pi2(∆T )
2] .
Weitzman (2008) introduced the exponential loss function which is very similar to the inverse
quadratic for small values of ∆T , but allows for greater losses when ∆T is large:
L(∆T ) = exp[−β(∆T )2] . (4)
I will use this loss function of eqn. (4) when calculating WTP under the direct impact
assumption.
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To introduce uncertainty over the impact of warming, I will treat the parameter β as
a random variable that can be described by a 3-parameter displaced gamma distribution.
Although the IPCC does not provide standardized distributions for lost GDP corresponding
to any particular ∆T as it does for climate sensitivity, it does survey the results of several
IAMS. As discussed below, I use the information from the IPCC along with other studies to
infer means and confidence intervals for β.
3.2 Growth Rate Impact.
There are three reasons to expect warming to affect the growth rate of GDP as opposed to
the level. First, some effects of warming are likely to be permanent: for example, destruction
of ecosystems from erosion and flooding, extinction of species, and deaths from health effects
and weather extremes. If warming affected the level of GDP directly, e.g., as per eqn. (4), it
would imply that if temperatures rise but later fall, e.g., because of stringent abatement or
geo-engineering, GDP could return to its but-for path with no permanent loss. This is not
the case, however, if ∆T affects the growth rate of GDP.
Suppose, for example, that temperature increases by 0.1◦C per year for 50 years and then
decreases by 0.1◦C per year for the next 50 years. Figure 3 compares two consumption tra-
jectories: CAt , which corresponds to the loss function of eqn. (4), and C
B
t , which corresponds
to the following growth rate loss function:
gt = g0 − γ∆Tt (5)
The example assumes that without warming, consumption would grow at 0.5 percent per
year — trajectory C0t — and both loss functions are calibrated so that at the maximum ∆T
of 5◦C, CA = CB = .95C0. Note that as ∆T falls to zero, CAt reverts to C
0
t , but C
B
t remains
permanently below C0t .
Second, resources needed to counter the impact of higher temperatures would reduce
those available for R&D and capital investment, reducing growth. Adaptation to rising
temperatures is equivalent to the cost of increasingly strict emission standards, which, as
Stokey (1998) has shown with an endogenous growth model, reduces the rate of return
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on capital and lowers the growth rate. As a simple example, suppose total capital K =
Kp +Ka(T ), with K
′
a(T ) > 0, where Kp is directly productive capital and Ka(T ) is capital
needed for adaptation to the temperature T (e.g., stronger retaining walls and pumps to
counter flooding, new infrastructure and housing to support migration, more air conditioning
and insulation, etc.). If all capital depreciates at rate δK , K˙p = K˙−K˙a = I−δKK−K
′
a(T )T˙ ,
so that the rate of growth of Kp is reduced.
Third, there is empirical support for a growth rate effect. Using historical data on
temperatures and precipitation over the past 50 years for a panel of 136 countries, Dell,
Jones, and Olken (2008) have shown that higher temperatures reduce GDP growth rates
but not levels. The impact they estimate is large — a decrease of 1.1 percentage points of
growth for each 1◦C rise in temperature — but significant only for poorer countries.3
To calculate WTP when ∆T affects the growth rate of GDP, I assume that in the absence
of warming, real GDP and consumption would grow at a constant rate g0, but warming will
reduce this rate according to eqn. (5). This simple linear relation was estimated by Dell,
Jones, and Olken (2008), and can be viewed as at least a first approximation to a more
complex loss function. I introduce uncertainty by making the parameter γ, like β, a random
variable drawn from a displaced gamma distribution.
3.3 Distributions for β and γ.
To compare the effects of a direct versus growth rate impact on estimates of WTP, we need
to fit and “match” the distributions for β and γ. This is done as follows.
Using information from a number of IAMs, I fit the three parameters in a displaced
gamma distribution for β in the exponential-quadratic loss function of eqn. (4). I then trans-
late this into an equivalent distribution for γ using the trajectory for GDP and consumption
implied by eqn. (5) for a temperature change-impact combination projected to occur at hori-
3“Poor” means below-median PPP-adjusted per-capita GDP. Using World Bank data for 209 countries,
“poor” by this definition accounts for 26.9% of 2006 world GDP, which implies a roughly 0.3 percentage
point reduction in world GDP growth for each 1◦C rise in temperature. In a follow-on paper (2009), they
estimate a model that allows for adaptation effects, so that the long-run impact of warming is smaller than
the short-run impact. They find a long-run decrease of 0.51 percentage points of growth for each 1◦C rise in
temperature, but again only for poorer countries.
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zonH. From eqns. (3) and (5), the growth rate is gt = g0−2γ∆TH[1−(1/2)
t/H]. Normalizing
initial consumption at 1, this implies:
Ct = e
∫ t
0
g(s)ds = exp
{
−
2γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
+ (g0 − 2γ∆TH)t+
2γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
(1/2)t/H
}
. (6)
Thus γ is obtained from β by equating the expressions for CH implied by eqns. (4) and (6):
exp
{
−
2γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
+ (g0 − 2γ∆TH)H +
γH∆TH
ln(1/2)
}
= exp{g0H − β(∆TH)
2} , (7)
so that β and γ have the simple linear relationship:
γ = 1.79β∆TH/H . (8)
3.3.1 Distribution for β.
To fit a displaced gamma distribution for β, I utilitze the IPCC’s survey of several IAMS.
This information from the IPCC, along with other studies, allow me to infer means and
confidence intervals for β. These IAMs yield a rough consensus regarding possible economic
impacts: for temperature increases up to 4◦C, the “most likely” impact is from 1% to at most
5% of GDP. (Of course this consensus might arise from the use of similar ad hoc damage
functions in various IAMs.) Of interest is the outer tail of the distribution for this impact.
There is some chance that a temperature increase of 3◦C or 4◦C would have a much larger
impact, and we want to know how that affects WTP.
Based on its survey of impact estimates from four IAMs, the IPCC (2007b) concludes
that “global mean losses could be 1–5% of GDP for 4◦C of warming.”4 In addition, Dietz and
Stern (2008) provide a graphical summary of damage estimates from several IAMs, which
yield a range of 0.5% to 2% of lost GDP for ∆T = 3◦C, and 1% to 8% of lost GDP for
∆T = 5◦C. I treat these ranges as “most likely” outcomes, and use the IPCC’s definition
of “most likely” to mean a 66 to 90-percent confidence interval. Using the IPCC range
and, to be conservative, assuming it applies to a 66-percent confidence interval, I take the
mean loss for ∆T = 4◦C to be 3% of GDP, and the 17-percent and 83-percent confidence
4The IAMs surveyed by the IPCC include Hope (2006), Mendelsohn et al (1998), Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000), and Tol (2002). For a recent overview of economic impact studies, see Tol (2009).
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points to be 1% of GDP and 5% of GDP respectively. We can then use eqn. (4) to get the
mean, 17-percent, and 83-percent values for β, which I denote by β¯, β1, and β2 respectively.
For example, .97 = e−β¯(4)
2
, so that β¯ = .00190. Likewise, β1 = .000628 and β2 = .00321.
Fitting a displaced gamma distribution to these numbers yields r = 4.5, λ = 1528, and
θ = β¯ − r/λ = −.00105.
Figure 4 shows the fitted distribution for β. Also shown is the fitted distribution when
“most likely” is taken to mean a 90-percent confidence interval, so that β1 and β2 instead
apply to the 5- and 95-percent confidence points.
3.3.2 Distribution for γ.
The mean, 17-percent, and 83-percent values for β applied to a ∆TH = 4
◦C at a horizon
H = 100 years, so from eqn. (8), γ = .0716β. Thus the mean, 17-percent, and 83-percent
values for γ are, respectively, γ¯ = .0001360, γ1 = .0000450, and γ2 = .0002298. Now,
suppose f(x; r, λ, θ) is the displaced gamma distribution for x, and we want the distribution
f(y; r1, λ1, θ1) for y = ax. We can make use of the fact that the expectation, variance,
and skewness of x and of y are related as follows: E(y) = aE(x) = ar/λ + aθ, V(y) =
a2V(x) = a2r/λ2, and S(y) = a3S(x) = 2a3r/λ3. This implies that θ1 = aθ, r1 = r, and
λ1 = λ/a. Thus the matched distribution for γ will be the same as that for β, except that
λ1 = 1528/.0716 = 21,340 and θ1 = .0716(−.00105) = −.0000752. The distribution for γ,
shown graphically in Pindyck (2009), will have exactly the same shape as the distribution
for β but a different scaling.
4 Willingness to Pay.
Given the distributions for ∆T and β or γ, I posit a CRRA social utility function:
U(Ct) = C
1−η
t /(1− η) , (9)
where η is the index of relative risk aversion (and 1/η is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution). Social welfare is measured as the expected sum over time of discounted utility:
W = E
∫
∞
0
U(Ct)e
−δtdt , (10)
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where δ is the rate of time preference, i.e., the rate at which utility is discounted. Note
that this rate is different from the consumption discount rate, which in the Ramsey growth
context would be Rt = δ + ηgt. If ∆T affects consumption directly, then Rt = δ + ηg0,
and does not change over time. If ∆T affects the growth rate of consumption, then Rt =
δ + ηg0 − 2ηγ∆TH[1− (1/2)
t/H ], so Rt falls over time as ∆T increases.
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For both the direct and growth rate impact models, I calculate the fraction of consump-
tion — now and throughout the future — society would sacrifice to ensure that any increase
in temperature at a specific horizon H is limited to an amount τ . That fraction, w∗(τ ), is
the measure of willingness to pay.6
4.1 WTP: Direct Impact.
Using eqn. (3), if ∆TH and β were known, social welfare would be given by:
W =
∫
∞
0
U(Ct)e
−δtdt =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
eρ0−ρ1t−2ρ0(1/2)
t/H+ρ0(1/2)
2t/H
dt , (11)
where
ρ0 = 4(η − 1)β(∆TH)
2 , (12)
ρ1 = (η − 1)g0 + δ . (13)
Suppose society sacrifices a fraction w(τ ) of present and future consumption to keep
∆TH ≤ τ . With uncertainty over ∆TH and β, social welfare at t = 0 is:
W1 =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
E0,τ
∫
∞
0
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−2ρ˜0(1/2)
t/H+ρ˜0(1/2)2t/Hdt , (14)
where E0,τ denotes the expectation at t = 0 over the distributions of ∆TH and β conditional
on ∆TH ≤ τ . (Tildes are used to denote that ρ0 and ρ1 are functions of two random
variables.) If no action is taken to limit warming, social welfare would be:
W2 =
1
1− η
E0
∫
∞
0
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−2ρ˜0(1/2)
t/H+ρ˜0(1/2)2t/Hdt , (15)
5If 2ηγ∆TH > δ + ηg0, Rt becomes negative as ∆T grows. This is entirely consistent with the Ramsey
growth model, as pointed out by Dasgupta et al (1999).
6The use of WTP as a welfare measure goes back at least to Debreu (1954), was used by Lucas (1987) to
estimate the welfare cost of business cycles, and was used in the context of climate change (with τ = 0) by
Heal and Kristro¨m (2002) and Weitzman (2008).
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where E0 again denotes the expectation over ∆TH and β, but now with ∆TH unconstrained.
Willingness to pay to ensure that ∆TH ≤ τ is the value w
∗(τ ) that equates W1(τ ) and W2.
7
Given the distributions f(∆T ) and g(β) for ∆TH and β respectively, denote by Mτ(t)
and M∞(t) the time-t expectations
Mτ (t) =
1
F (τ )
∫ τ
θT
∫
∞
θβ
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−2ρ˜0(1/2)
t/H+ρ˜0(1/2)
2t/H
f(∆T )g(β)d∆Tdβ (16)
and
M∞(t) =
∫
∞
θT
∫
∞
θβ
eρ˜0−ρ˜1t−2ρ˜0(1/2)
t/H+ρ˜0(1/2)
2t/H
f(∆T )g(γ)d∆Tdγ , (17)
where ρ˜0 and ρ˜1 are given by eqns. (12) and (13), θT and θβ are the lower limits on the
distributions for ∆T and β, and F (τ ) =
∫ τ
θT
f(∆T )d∆T . Thus W1(τ ) and W2 are:
W1(τ ) =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
∫
∞
0
Mτ(t)dt ≡
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
Gτ (18)
and
W2 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
M∞(t)dt ≡
1
1− η
G∞ . (19)
Setting W1(τ ) equal to W2, WTP is given by:
w∗(τ ) = 1 − [G∞/Gτ ]
1
1−η . (20)
The solution for w∗(τ ) depends on the distributions for ∆T and γ, the horizon H =
100 years, and the parameters η, g0, and δ (values for which are discussed below). We will
examine how w∗ varies with τ ; the cost of abatement should be a decreasing function of τ ,
so given estimates of that cost, one could use these results to determine abatement targets.
4.2 WTP: Growth Rate Impact.
If ∆TH instead affects the growth rate of consumption as in eqn. (5), and if ∆TH and γ were
known, social welfare would be:
W =
∫
∞
0
U(Ct)e
−δtdt =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
eω0−ω1t−ω0(1/2)
t/H
dt , (21)
7I calculate WTP using a finite horizon of 500 years. After some 200 years the world will likely exhaust
the economically recoverable stocks of fossil fuels, so that GHG concentrations will fall. In addition, so many
other economic and social changes are likely that the relevance of applying CRRA expected utility over more
than a few hundred years is questionable.
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where
ω0 = 2(η − 1)γH∆TH/ ln(1/2) . (22)
ω1 = (η − 1)(g0 − 2γ∆TH) + δ , (23)
If society sacrifices a fraction w(τ ) of present and future consumption to keep ∆TH ≤ τ
and there is uncertainty over ∆TH and γ, social welfare at t = 0 is:
W1(τ ) =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
E0,τ
∫
∞
0
eω˜0−ω˜1t−ω˜0(1/2)
t/H
dt . (24)
If no action is taken to limit warming, social welfare would be:
W2 =
1
1− η
E0
∫
∞
0
eω˜0−ω˜1t−ω˜0(1/2)
t/H
dt . (25)
Once again, WTP is the value w∗(τ ) that equatesW1(τ ) and W2. DefiningMτ (t) andM∞(t)
as before, but with g(γ) instead of g(β), eqns. (18), (19), and (20) again apply.
5 Results.
WTP is essentially a measure of the “demand” side of policy — the maximum amount society
would be willing to sacrifice to obtain the benefits of limited warming. The case for an actual
GHG abatement policy will depend on the cost of that policy as well as the benefits. The
framework I use does not involve estimates of abatement costs — I only estimate WTP as
a function of τ , the abatement-induced limit on any increase in temperature at the horizon
H. Clearly the amount and cost of abatement needed will decrease as τ is made larger, so I
consider a stringent abatement policy to be one for which τ is “low,” which I take to be at or
below the expected value of ∆T under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, i.e., about 3◦C,
and w∗(τ ) is “high,” i.e., at least 3 percent. At issue in this paper is the extent to which
estimates of WTP depend on whether ∆T is assumed to affect the level of consumption
directly versus the growth rate of consumption.
In addition to the distributions for ∆T and the impact parameters β or γ, WTP depends
on the values for the index of relative risk aversion η, the rate of time discount δ, and the
base level real growth rate g0. To explore the case for a stringent abatement policy, I make
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conservative assumptions about η, δ, and g0, in the sense of choosing numbers that would
lead to a higher WTP.
The finance and macroeconomics literature has estimates of η ranging from 1.5 to 6,
and estimates of δ ranging from .01 to .04. The historical real growth rate g ranges from
.02 to .025. It has been argued, however, that for intergenerational comparisons δ should
be close to zero, on the grounds that society not should value the well-being of our great-
grandchildren less than our own. Likewise, while values of η well above 2 may be consistent
with the (relatively short-horizon) behavior of investors, we might use lower values for inter-
generational welfare comparisons. Because I want to determine whether current assessments
of uncertainty over temperature change and its impact generate a high enough WTP to
justify stringent abatement, I will stack the deck in favor of our great-grandchildren and use
relatively low values of η and δ: around 2 for η and 0 for δ. Also, WTP is a decreasing
function of the base growth rate g0, so I will set g0 = .02, the low end of the historical range.
5.1 No Uncertainty.
It is useful to begin by considering a deterministic world in which the trajectory for ∆T and
the impact of that trajectory are known with certainty. Then eqns. (18) and (19) for the
direct impact case would simplify to:
W1 =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
∫
∞
0
eρ0−ρ1t−2ρ0(1/2)
t/H+ρ0(1/2)
2t/H
dt , (26)
W2 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
eρ0−ρ1t−2ρ0(1/2)
t/H+ρ0(1/2)
2t/H
dt , (27)
where now β¯, the mean of β, replaces β in eqn. (12) for ρ0. (I will use the means of β and γ
as their certainty-equivalent values.) Likewise, eqns. (24) and (25) for the case of a growth
rate impact would simplify to:
W1(τ ) =
[1− w(τ )]1−η
1− η
∫
∞
0
eω0−ω1t−ω0(1/2)
t/H
dt , (28)
W2 =
1
1− η
∫
∞
0
eω0−ω1t−ω0(1/2)
t/H
dt , (29)
where now the mean γ¯ replaces γ in eqns. (22) and (23) for ω0 and ω1.
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For both impact models, I calculate the WTP to keep ∆T zero for all time, i.e., w∗(0),
over a range of values for ∆T at the horizon H = 100. For this exercise, I set η = 2, δ = 0,
and g0 = .020. The results are shown in Figure 5, where w
∗
c (0) applies to the case where ∆T
affects C directly, and w∗g(0) applies to the case where ∆T affects the growth rate of C .
The graph says that if, for example, ∆TH = 6
◦C, w∗c (0) is about .03, and w
∗
g(0) is about
.022. Thus if ∆T affects consumption directly, society should be willing to give about 3%
of current and future consumption to keep ∆T at zero instead of 6◦C. But if ∆T affects the
growth rate of consumption, the willingness to pay is only about 2.2%. (Remember that the
“known ∆T ” applies to time t = H. ∆Tt follows the trajectory given by eqn. (3).)
Note that both w∗c (0) and w
∗
g(0) become much larger as the known ∆TH becomes larger
than 8◦C; such temperature outcomes, however, have low probability. In addition, these
curves have different shapes: w∗c (0) is a convex function of ∆TH, while w
∗
g(0) is a (nearly)
linear function of ∆TH.
8 This means that for small changes in temperature, a growth rate
impact model will yield a slightly higher WTP, but for very large changes in temperature,
the direct impact model yields much larger WTPs. Whether this difference matters for
estimates of WTP under uncertainty depends on the probability distributions for ∆TH and
β and γ. With sufficient probability mass in the right-hand tails of the distributions, the
two impact models should yield different numbers for WTP. We explore this below.
5.2 Uncertainty Over Temperature and Economic Impact.
I now allow for uncertainty over both ∆T and the relevant impact parameter (either β or γ),
using the calibrated distributions for each. WTP is given by eqns. (16) to (20) for the direct
impact model, and eqns. (24) and (25) for the growth rate impact. The calculated values of
8To see that w∗c (0) is a convex function of ∆TH , note that if τ = 0, eqns. (26) and (27) imply that
w∗c (0) = 1−
[
ρ
∫
∞
0
e−ρt−4(1−η)β¯∆T
2
Hψ(t)dt
] 1
1−η
where ψ(t) = [1 − (1/2)t/H ]2. Just differentiate to see that dw∗c/d∆TH > 0 for all values of ∆TH and
β¯, and and d2w∗c/d∆T
2
H > 0 for sufficiently small values of ∆TH and β¯ (in our case, as long as ∆TH <
15.8 ◦C). Similarly, we can show that dw∗g/d∆TH > 0 and d
2w∗c/d∆T
2
H is a small negative number (in our
case -.000063), a curvature small enough so that in Figure 5, w∗g(0) appears linear.
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WTP as are shown as functions of τ in Figure 6 for δ = 0, g0 = .020, and η = 2 and 1.5.
Note that if η = 2, WTP is always less than 1.5%, even for τ = 0. To obtain a WTP above
2% requires a lower value of η. As Figure 6 shows, if η = 1.5, w∗(τ ) reaches about 3% for τ
around 0 or 1◦C, but only when the impact of warming occurs through the growth rate of
consumption. When the impact is direct, w∗ is always below 2.5%.
Because relatively large values of WTP can only be obtained for small values of η, the
top two lines in Figure 6 have the greatest policy relevance. But note that when η = 1.5,
the difference between w∗g(τ ) and w
∗
c (τ ) is only significant for τ below 2
◦C. It seems unlikely
that a politically and economically feasible policy would be adopted that would prevent any
warming, or limit it to 1 or even 2◦C. If we belive that a “feasible” policy is one that limits
∆T to its expected value of around 3◦C, then as Figure 6 shows, the direct and growth rate
impact models give similar values for WTP.
On the other hand, what if we take the view that the “correct” value of η is less than
1.5? Figure 7 shows the dependence of WTP on the index of risk aversion, η. It plots w∗(3),
i.e., the WTP to ensure ∆TH ≤ 3
◦C at H = 100 years, for g0 = .02, as a function of η.
Although w∗(3) is below 2% for values of η above 1.5, it approaches 5% as η is reduced to
1 (the value used in Stern (2007)). The reason is that while future utility is not discounted
(because δ = 0), future consumption is implicitly discounted at the initial rate ηg0. If η is
made smaller, potential losses of future consumption have a larger impact on WTP. Also, as
discussed further below, w∗c (3) > (<)w
∗
g(3) when η > (<) 1.3.
These estimates of WTP are based on zero discounting of future uility. While there may
be an ethical argument for zero discounting, δ = 0 is outside the range of estimates of the
rate of time preference obtained from consumer and investor behavior. However, estimates
of WTP above 3% depend critically on this assumption of a δ = 0. Figure 8 again plots
w∗c (3) and w
∗
g(3), but this time with δ = .01. Note that for either impact model, discounting
future utility, even at a very low rate, will considerably reduce WTP. With δ = .01, w∗(3) is
again below 2% for all values of η, and for either impact model.
The results so far indicate that for either impact model, large values of WTP require fairly
extreme combinations of parameter values. However, these results are based on distributions
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for ∆TH, β and γ that were calibrated to studies in the IPCC’s 2007 report and concurrent
economic studies, and those studies were done several years prior to 2007. More recent
studies suggest that “most likely” values for ∆T in 2100 might be higher than the 1.0◦C
to 4.5◦C range given by the IPCC. For example, a recent report by Sokolov et al (2009)
suggests an expected value for ∆T in 2100 of around 4 to 5◦C, as opposed to the 3.0◦C
expected value that I used. Thus I recalculate WTP for both impact models, for both δ =
0 and .01, but this time shifting the distribution for ∆TH to the right, so that it has a mean
of 5◦C, corresponding to the upper end of the 4 to 5◦C range in Sokolov et al (2009). (The
other moments of the distribution remain unchanged, and H is again 100 years).
The results are shown in Figures 9 and 10. Now if δ = 0 and η is below 1.5, w∗(3) is
above 3% when the impact of ∆T occurs through the growth rate, and above 4% when the
impact is direct, and reaches around 10% if η = 1. Even if δ = .01, w∗c (3) exceeds 4% when
η = 1 (although w∗g(3) only reaches 2..5%). Thus there are parameter values and plausible
distributions for ∆T that yield a large WTP. Those parameter values and distributions are
outside the current consensus range, but that may change as new studies of warming and its
impact become available.
As Figures 7 to 10 show, for either value of δ, w∗c (3) is usually higher than w
∗
g(3), and when
δ = .01 it is considerable higher. In the Ramsey growth context, the consumption discount
rate is δ+ ηgt, so even if δ = 0, future consumption (although not utility) is discounted (less
so for small values of η). When ∆T affects consumption directly, the loss of consumption
is greater at shorter horizons (but smaller at long horizons), making w∗c (3) > w
∗
g(3). (In
Figure 7, w∗c (3) < w
∗
g(3) when η < 1.3 because with a low consumption discount rate, the
larger long-run reduction in consumption from a growth rate impact overwhelms the smaller
short-run impact, even in expected value terms.)
6 Modeling and Policy Implications.
The integrated assessment models that I am aware of all relate temperature change to the
level of real GDP and consumption. As we have seen, this will often yield a higher WTP
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— and thus yield higher estimates of optimal GHG abatement — than will a model that
relates temperature change to the growth rate of GDP and consumption. How important is
the difference, and what do these results tell us about modeling?
In Pindyck (2009), using a model that related temperature change to the growth rate of
consumption, I found that for temperature and impact distributions based on the IPCC and
“conservative” parameter values (e.g., δ = 0, η = 2, and g0 = .02), WTP to prevent even a
small increase in temperature is around 2% or less, which is inconsistent with the immediate
adoption of a stringent GHG abatement policy. To what extent do those results change when
temperature change directly affects the level of consumption? And more broadly, what are
the policy implications of the results in this paper?
6.1 Implications for Modeling.
The difference in WTPs for a direct versus a growth rate impact is largest for large tem-
perature changes and for higher consumption discount rates. As we saw in Figure 5 for
the case of no uncertainty, w∗c (0) is a convex function of ∆T and thus becomes increasingly
greater than w∗g(0) as ∆T gets larger. Likewise, when there is uncertainty but the expected
temperature change is increased from 3◦C to 5◦C, the difference between w∗c (3) and w
∗
g(3)
becomes larger. And note from Figures 9 and 10 that the difference between w∗c (3) and w
∗
g(3)
is proportionally larger when the consumption discount rate (δ + ηg0) is larger, i.e., when η
is larger and/or when δ is .01 rather than 0.
If the consumption discount rate is large (i.e., if η is large and/or δ > 0), almost any
model will yield estimates of WTP and optimal abatement levels that are small. This is
simply the result of discounting over long horizons (greater than 50 years). That is why
model-based analyses that call for stringent abatement policies assume δ = 0 and relatively
low values for η. (Stern (2007, 2008), for example, uses δ = 0 and η = 1.) Thus if we limit
our analyses to the low end of the consensus range for η (around 1.5), even with δ = 0, the
choice of impact model will matter if evolving climate science studies yield increasingly large
estimates of expected temperature change.
Which impact model — direct versus growth rate — should one use for modeling? A
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direct impact model is simpler, easier to understand, and perhaps easier to estimate or
calibrate. But as I have argued at the beginning of this paper, there are strong theoretical
and empirical arguments that favor the growth rate impact. Until new studies demonstrate
otherwise, it seems to me that it is difficult to make the case for a direct impact.
6.2 Implications for Policy.
The results in this paper supplement those in Pindyck (2009) in terms of implications for
policy. We can summarize those implications as follows.
First, although the direct impact model often yields higher estimates of WTP, it is still
the case that using temperature and impact distributions based on the IPCC (2007) and
concurrent economic studies, for most parameter values our WTP estimates are still too low
to support a stringent GHG abatement policy. Of course these estimates do not suggest
that no abatement is optimal. For example, a WTP of 2% of GDP is in the range of cost
estimates for compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.9
In addition to the effects of discounting discussed above, our low estimates of WTP are
due to the limited weight in the tails of the distributions for ∆T and the impact parameter
β or γ. The probability of a realization in which ∆T ≥ 4.5◦C in 100 years and the impact
parameter is one standard deviation above its mean is less than 5 percent. An even more
extreme outcome in which ∆T = 7◦C (and the impact parameter is one standard deviation
above its mean) would imply about a 9 percent loss of GDP in 100 years for a growth rate
impact, but the probability of an outcome this bad or worse is less than 1 percent. And this
low-probability loss of GDP in 100 years would involve much smaller losses in earlier years.
Second, although these estimates of WTP are consistent with the current consensus
regarding future warming and its impact as summarized in IPCC (2007), that consensus may
be wrong, especially with respect to the tails of the distributions. Indeed, based on recent
studies, that consensus may already be shifting towards more dire estimates of warming and
its impact. As we saw from Figures 9 and 10, shifting the temperature distribution to the
9See the survey of cost studies by the Energy Information Administration (1998), and the more recent
country cost studies surveyed in IPCC (2007c).
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right so that E(∆TH) is 5
◦C instead of 3◦C results in substantially higher estimates of WTP.
7 Conclusions.
If we are to use economic models to evaluate GHG abatement policies, how should we treat
the impact of possible future increases in temperature? One could argue that we simply do
not (and cannot) know much about that impact because we have had no experience with
substantial amounts of warming, and there are no models or data that can tell us much
about the impact of warming on production, migration, disease prevalence, and a variety of
other relevant factors. Instead, I have taken existing IAMs and related models of economic
impact at face value and treated them analogously to the climate science models that are
used to predict temperature change or its probability distribution. In this way I obtained a
(displaced gamma) distribution for an impact parameter that relates temperature change to
consumption, or to the growth rate of consumption.
We have seen that in most cases, a direct impact yields a higher WTP than a growth rate
impact. The reason is that when ∆T affects consumption directly, the loss of consumption
is greater at short horizons (but smaller at long horizons). Consumption discounting can
give these short-horizon effects more weight. Even if future utility is not discounted (δ = 0),
the consumption discount rate (δ + ηg0) is still positive, and can be large if η is large.
Overall, I would argue that the choice of a direct versus growth rate impact should be
based on the underlying economics, and the growth rate specification has both theoretical
and empirical support. But even with a direct impact model, using temperature and impact
distributions based on the IPCC (2007) and concurrent economic studies, for most parameter
values our WTP estimates are still too low to support a stringent GHG abatement policy.
Of course there are parameter values and plausible distributions for ∆T that yield a large
WTP. Those distributions and parameter value are outside the current consensus range, but
that range may change as new studies of warming and its impact are done.
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Figure 7: WTP Versus η for τ = 3. g0 = .020 and δ = 0
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Figure 8: WTP Versus η for τ = 3. g0 = .020 and δ = .01
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